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In Being and Time, Heidegger claims that even when the 
feeling of angst is not experienced it remains latent. Fear, 
he maintains, is simply inauthentic angst. Likewise, he 
claims that the fact that we “fall” into the world, are fasci-
nated by it, define ourselves in terms of it, and care about 
our place within it is a manifestation of  “fleeing” from ourselves 
in response to angst. While some commentators have not seen 
these claims as problematic,1 why they are justified is not readily 
apparent, leading some to reject or dispute the grounding of fear 
in angst and the argument that falling and entanglement are 
modes of fleeing.2 In the following, I show how these claims are 
justified by Heidegger's phenomenological method and why 
they are best understood in connection with the concepts of at-
tunement, understanding, and disclosure.  
 
Attunement, Understanding, and Interpretation 
 
Who but the person asked can authoritatively answer the 
question “how are you?” Admittedly, etiquette dictates that we 
are always “fine,” yet we possess the capacity to answering such 
a question honestly, also. We answer to indicate the kind of 
mood we are in. For Heidegger, this is philosophically signifi-
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cant. He writes: 
  
One possibility of being for Da-sein is to give ontic 
“information” about itself as a being. Such information is 
possible only in the disclosedness belonging to Da-sein 
which is based on attunement and understanding. 
(Heidegger 1996, 172[184])3 
 
What this means is that our ability to give information about 
our mood implies we understand moods, meaning the condi-
tions for the possibility of moods must be given in such a way 
that allows us to access the spectrum of possible emotional states 
a priori. Also, moods determine our being so that we are not al-
ways aware of what mood we are in until asked. Heidegger in-
sists we are always in a mood, whether we experience it explic-
itly or not, and he terms the particular determination of our be-
ing by our mood Befindlichkeit, which literally means “how-you-
are-ness” (although I have chosen to render it as “attunement”). 
Thus, Heidegger, following Kierkegaard,4 can phenomenologi-
cally inquire into moods by means of a transcendental argument, 
heading into a territory the philosophical tradition hitherto dis-
missed or confined to the purview of aesthetics and literature.5 
To understand the significance of this mode of inquiry, we 
should first make sure we understand Heidegger's phenomenol-
ogical method. 
Heidegger's phenomenology rests on the “ontological differ-
ence” between beings and Being. “Beings,” that is, what we are 
aware of in perception, are understood on the basis of “Being,” 
that is, the a priori conditions for the possibility of encountering 
any beings whatsoever as meaningful.6 The term “ontic” corre-
sponds to “beings” and “ontological” corresponds to “Being.” 
“Being” represents the transcendental, i.e. the conditions for the 
possibility of beings as such, notions familiar from Kant and 
Husserl. What is unique about Heidegger's approach is that Kant 
and Husserl deal with problems such as the conditions for the 




mensional, or the logical foundation of the ego, while Heidegger 
deals with problems connected to lived, everyday experience, 
such as the conditions for understanding how to swing a ham-
mer, integrate into a social group, or recognize a car's turn indi-
cator while driving.7 In any experience of beings, certain infor-
mation must be disclosed to our understanding non-thematically 
and a priori. “Disclosed does not, as such, mean to be known,” 
though (Heidegger 1996, 127). Juxtaposed to the Kantian 
“categories” that comprise the conditions for the possibility of 
representations and rational judgments about them are the Hei-
deggerian “existentials” that comprise the conditions for the pos-
sibility of our existence in the world as such (being-in-the-world) 
and the particular “existentiells” or actualizations of the possi-
bilities granted to us (Heidegger 1996, 42[44-45]). The disclosed 
are what we bring with us to a specific experience implicitly. 
Following this method, “mood” ontically indicates an exis-
tentiell of what is present in one’s existential “attunement” and 
ontologically determines what is always present as a mood, 
whether one explicitly grasps what mood one is in or not. For 
instance, if one is in a bad mood one’s attention would be di-
rected ontically to the mood itself or causes such as the weather 
or one’s fatigue. However, our attunements show the meaning 
of our moods to be the following: First, moods disclose the cir-
cumstances of each of our “selves” [Dasein] in our being 
“there” [da] as a burden in need of alleviation. Thus, being-there 
as a burden is fundamental to every attunement. As it is, we are 
born “thrown” into our lives such that we must bear the weight 
of our Being, even if we blame our moods on things outside of 
ourselves.  
This constitutes the second feature of attunement: moods 
seem to come from the world itself—our relationships, jobs, or 
activities—and bad moods sometimes seem to carry the entire 
world with them. At other times, moods seem to cut off the rest 
of the world and direct us to a single matter of concern. Phe-
nomenologically, this entails that we “turn” away from con-
sciousness of our burdensome being-there towards the world. 
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Heidegger calls this turning towards the world “falling.” This 
third feature of attunement reveals that we fundamentally exist 
in such a way that the world “matters” to us such that it can af-
fect our mood, instead of just floating by as thought it were a 
meaningless rush of color, light, and sound. Things can be fear-
some, lovely, sentimental, or dreary. Attunement means our 
moods connect us a priori to the world, in such a way that they 
disclose our being-there, our “falling” into the world, and that 
things we encounter necessarily “matter” to us in an affective 
way (Heidegger 1996, 126-131[134-141]). 
Alongside attunement is always an understanding which is 
not always explicit. It includes what is circumspectively8 disclosed 
to us as well as that which is explicitly apparent. Additionally, it 
can disclose our attunement to us, alongside all of the possibili-
ties contained therein. For instance, Heidegger writes of experi-
encing fear: 
  
Circumspection sees what is fearsome because it is in the 
attunement of fear. As a dormant possibility of attuned 
being-in-the-world, fearing, “fearfulness” has already 
disclosed the world with regard to the fact that some-
thing like a fearful thing can draw near to us from this 
fearfulness. (Heidegger 1996, 132[141]) 
 
We can become terrified at any time, which means that the 
possibility of the fearsome is disclosed to us.  Interpretation is an 
act by which it is possible to make one’s understanding explicit 
by allowing a concept or symbol to stand “as” one’s experience 
or attunement. Sometimes what is disclosed is interpreted as 
something else and “covered up” by language so that it becomes 
trivialized.9 The purpose of Heidegger's phenomenology is to 
rediscover such disclosures and uncover them. 
In order to discuss Heidegger's analysis of angst, we should 
first understand the purpose of his inquiry. Everyday human 
dealings and our various attunements, entangle us constantly in 




dayness seems to involve a kind of running away from ourselves 
and into the world. We then interpret ourselves in terms of our 
attachments to it— e.g. our jobs, what we do, and the kind of 
people we think we fit in with. We no longer see ourselves as 
separate entities. Heidegger's goal is to demonstrate ontologi-
cally (that is, in a way that demonstrates the meaning) that fal-
ling and entanglement in the world are modes of fleeing from 
ones self. The direction of motion (away) is apparent, but this 
merely ontically describes falling as fleeing. This interpretation 
of falling can only be ontologically significant if we explain the 
significance of fleeing’s direction. Because of the close connec-
tion between attunement and understanding, particular attune-
ments strike close to relevant ontological data, disclosing it, and 
allowing us to interpret it. Angst, specifically, offers a way to 
approach the phenomenon of falling, and can thus disclose its 
character. This is because angst represents an inability to fall, as 
will be demonstrated.  
 
Attuning to Angst  
 
Because of the way attunement and understanding operate, 
Heidegger must merely demonstrate that the feeling of angst is 
possible in order to illustrate its character. He can because our 
understanding discloses these moods as possible for us. It seems 
that we are capable of taking on the perspective of someone ex-
periencing an attunement prior to exposure to that mood. When 
we say “I can imagine how she feels,” we are saying that we 
know how the world must look from within her attunement. In 
literature we read about all kinds of situations that we have not 
undergone personally, and yet we can understand what the 
character is feeling by imagining that we are there in his shoes, 
that we share his attachments to the world. We “find ourselves” 
there and understand what mood he must be in. That the under-
standings disclosed in every particular attunement are ontologi-
cally determined a priori merely means that we have the ability 
to empathize with any attunement. Therefore, if Heidegger’s ar-
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gument strikes deep within us so that we feel angst when we 
contemplate it, then he will have sufficiently demonstrated the 
phenomenon to us.10 
Ich habe Angst literally means “I have fear” in German, but 
Heidegger is following Kierkegaard  by qualifying its use.11 Hei-
degger distinguishes these attunements from each other because 
fear ontically “turns away” from what threatens it and flees and 
is “about” the thing it flees from. Angst, on the other hand, is not 
about innerworldly beings. Instead, Dasein wishes to flee itself.  
“That about which one has Angst is being in the world as 
such” (Heidegger 1996, 174[186]). Angst finds the whole pros-
pect of being-in-the-world-as-such overwhelming and terrifying, 
which means that angst does not have a specific object within the 
world, nor is angst afraid of a specific possibility in the future. It 
is afraid of possibility as such. “What Angst is about is com-
pletely indefinite” (Heidegger 1996, 174[186]). In the grip of 
angst, we are overwhelmed by the task of living. 
  
Nothing of that which is at hand and objectively present 
within the world functions as what angst is about. The 
totality of relevance discovered within the world of 
things at hand and objectively present is completely with-
out importance. It collapses. The world has the character 
of complete insignificance. In Angst we do not even en-
counter this or that thing, which, as threatening, could be 
relevant. (Heidegger 1996, 174[186]) 
 
Additionally, angst has a spatial component. Unlike fear, its 
object does not approach from afar—what is threatening is 
“nowhere,” which does not mean nothing; rather, “region in 
general lies therein, and disclosedness of the world in general for 
essentially spatial being-in” (Heidegger 1996, 174[186]). If we 
recall Heidegger's description of spatiality, we will remember 
that Dasein does not move from point A to B as if it were moving 
across Newtonian space, but rather “de-distances” itself by mov-




(including the possibility of de-distancing) terrify Dasein as 
such, angst is, as it were, simultaneously claustrophobia and 
agoraphobia—one feels trapped by the infinite and over-
whelmed by the openness of one’s confines. “It is so near that it 
is oppressive and stifles one's breath—yet it is no-
where” (Heidegger 1996, 174[186]). For one with angst, things 
within the world, possible spatial directions, and the interest that 
they used to spark has faded. “What oppresses us is not this or 
that, nor is it everything objectively present together as a sum, 
but the possibility of things-at-hand in general, that is, the world 
itself” (Heidegger 1996, 175[187]).  
Thus, Heidegger says that when we say “it was really noth-
ing,” we get at the ontic nature of what angst is about; that is, it 
contains neither the ontic sum of every possible being nor a par-
ticular being. This nothing of the sum total is not nonexistent, 
but it is a nothing because angst has skipped over all things and 
advanced to the condition of their possibility—the world. It is 
anxious about existing in the world in general (Heidegger 2008, 
101). Angst renders us speechless. We cannot say anything about 
what ails us, because it does not appear against the background 
of the world we live in. Instead, it is our existence within the 
world as such that we find so frightening. We cannot put it into 
the context of our lives because it lies outside of and scaffolds 
that context. In passing moments of depression as in angst,12 one 
is often prone to wish to break the silence in one’s mind by 
“changing the topic” to something utterable or even by speaking 
under one’s breath.  
 
Angst as Disclosure: World as World, Individualized Possibility 
as Such, and Unheimlichkeit 
  
So where do we find ourselves when we are attuned to 
angst? Recall that what is disclosed is not necessarily conceptual-
ized by the experiencing subject, but is the implicit content of an 
experience that can be pointed to by the phenomenologist. What 
is disclosed in angst is the world as world, precisely because 
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“the world can offer nothing more, nor can the Mitda-sein of oth-
ers” (Heidegger 1996, 175[187]). What one feels (the phenome-
non now open for study) is a breakdown in one’s usual directed-
ness towards a particular object in the world, insofar as the 
mood of angst is unable to find any joy or significance in the dis-
traction of activity. Dasein feels entirely unable to go on. The 
world itself becomes obtrusive.13 What is disclosed here is the 
collapsed bridge, as it were, between Dasein's being and the 
world, insofar as the world no longer is able to draw Dasein into 
it. 
 
Thus angst takes away from Da-sein the possibility of un-
derstanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the “world” 
and the public way of being interpreted. It throws Da-
sein back upon that for which it is anxious, its authentic 
potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. (Heidegger 1996, 175-
6[187]) 
 
But what is this essential bridge between being and world? 
Precisely Dasein's ability to “project” itself upon possibilities of 
being (Heidegger 1996, 136-139[145-149]). This “projection” is 
disclosed in angst, precisely because Dasein could try to project 
itself into an activity in the world but cannot. Thus, the inde-
pendence of Dasein's projection is disclosed. Normally, Dasein is 
so involved in the world that its possibilities are moot. In angst, 
however, as in boredom (Heidegger 2008, 99), one is unprojected 
and thus fully exposed to one’s being as dynamic potential. Also, 
and most importantly, this individuates Dasein because it is con-
centrated on its own personal being-in-the-world. In despairing 
its condition, Dasein is brought face-to-face with the kind of be-
ing that it is: a single individual. Thus, Heidegger writes: 
  
Angst individualizes and thus discloses Dasein as “solus 
ipse.” This existential “solipsism,” however, is so far from 
transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless 




in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world, 
and thus itself before itself as being-in-the-world. 
(Heidegger 1996, 176[188]) 
 
Dasein, in angst, feels itself as solus ipse, that is, as an “alone 
self.” Heidegger calls this feeling existential solipsism. We cannot 
understand this in the anachronistic sense of “aloneness of exis-
tence” inherited from existentialism, but rather in Heidegger's 
qualified use of existential as referring to a structural component 
of Dasein's existence rather than a particular mode of existing 
within that structure (designated existentiell). This is evident 
from the use of “discloses,” which means we are looking at the 
phenomenological structure, not at Dasein's direct experience of 
something akin to solipsism (Dreyfus, 177). If the world can no 
longer provide one with comfort, one feels alone. Not only that, 
but we can now distinguish individuality as an existential struc-
ture (Heidegger 1996, 122[130]). 
This individuation lays the groundwork for authenticity. 
Angst discloses Dasein's freedom to grasp itself authentically, 
insofar as in the absence of tranquillization Dasein recognizes its 
choice of possibilities.. This is not to say that Dasein necessarily 
grasps itself as able to choose new possibilities for itself in a ro-
bust sense, but that it discloses to the phenomenologist that 
Dasein has a way of determining these possibilities for itself. Let 
us say, for instance, I have been swept into a job as a postal 
worker by culture and circumstance. I then have a major psycho-
logical breakdown which I attribute to my job, so that I consider 
changing my career. To the phenomenologist, this demonstrates 
that a degree of freedom and the power of determinacy with re-
gard to existentiell possibilities are part of Dasein's existential 
structure. But I need not grasp this myself.  
Lastly, angst discloses that Dasein's existence unheimlich 
(uncanny), the etymological construction of which is not-at-
home. Insofar as attunement is an answer to “how one is,” 
angst’s reply is “unheimlich.” Recall that angst is “nowhere” spa-
tially and “nothing” content-wise. In analyzing Dasein's struc-
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ture, Heidegger pointed to the way we dwell “at home” in the 
world when tranquilized by our activities. 
Dasein is still in the world while it is feeling angst, it simply 
loses its ability to find meaning within that world. Thus, all of 
the structural components remain during angst, but Dasein can-
not find relief in the world. Thus, Dasein is located in the world, 
but does not feel it belongs. 
Remember we are examining angst because it promises to 
disclose the flight of Dasein from itself in an ontologically signifi-
cant way rather than a merely ontically characterizing Dasein's 
path of motion. But why choose this specific attunement? Hei-
degger writes: 
  
It is true that it is the nature of every kind of attunement 
to disclose complete being-in-the-world in all its constitu-
tive factors (world, being-in, self). However, in Angst 
there lies the possibility of a distinctive disclosure, since 
Angst individualizes. This individualizing fetches Da-sein 
back from its falling prey and reveals to it authenticity 
and inauthenticity as possibilities of its being. The funda-
mental possibilities of Da-sein, which are always my 
own, show themselves in Angst as they are, undistorted 
by innerworldy beings to which Da-sein, initially and for 
the most part, clings.14 
 
The Grounding of Falling in Fleeing 
 
So now we have shown that angst discloses Dasein’s struc-
tural individualism, dynamic potential for actualization through 
possibilities offered by the world, and sense of fundamental un-
canniness. But Heidegger's purpose here was to ground fleeing 
in falling ontologically. Has the disclosure of angst accomplished 
this?  
The argument requires two movements. First, Heidegger 
must demonstrate that the phenomenon of angst reveals falling 
to be fleeing.15 Second, Heidegger must demonstrate that ordi-
nary falling structurally is also fleeing, which he will do by argu-
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ing that angst is always present, whether felt or latent. The first is 
simple and has been alluded to throughout. Heidegger writes:  
 
...What falling prey, as flight, is fleeing from becomes 
phenomenally visible. It is not a flight from innerworldly 
beings, but precisely toward them as the beings among 
which taking care of things, lost in the they [das Man], can 
linger in tranquilized familiarity. Entangled flight into the 
being-at-home of publicness is flight from not-being-at-
home, that is, from the uncanniness which lies in Da-sein 
as thrown, as being-in-the-world entrusted to itself in its 
being. (Heidegger  1996, 176-177[189]) 
 
This is readily apparent in the case of depression; what lifts 
depression is taking one’s mind from the matter. This demon-
strates a desire to flee the feeling of not being at home by feeling 
at home again in the world. However, Heidegger immediately 
makes the second move, by adding: 
  
This uncanniness constantly pursues Da-sein and threat-
ens his everyday lostness in the they [das Man], although 
not explicitly. This threat can factically go along with 
complete security and self-sufficiency of the everyday 
way of taking care of things. Angst can arise in the most 
harmless situations. (Heidegger 1996, 177[189]) 
 
But what does Heidegger mean by this? Does Heidegger im-
ply that the desire to flee from angst is a psychological motivation 
underlying all human behavior?  
Here are the claims Heidegger makes. First, he writes: “If we 
interpret the uncanniness of Da-sein existentially and ontologi-
cally as a threat which concerns Da-sein itself and which comes 
from itself, we are not asserting that uncanniness has always al-
ready understood in factical Angst in this sense” (Heidegger 
1996, 177[189]). Heidegger is making interpretive claims about 
the meaning of Da-sein's uncanniness instead of implying this to 
be the way Dasein interprets its angst. Rather, “The everyday-
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ness way in which Da-sein understands uncanniness is the entan-
gled turning away which “phases out” not-being-at-
home” (Heidegger 1996, 177[189]). In fact, Dasein does not inter-
pret its angst as anything, because it reflexively “phases out” its 
angst by turning away. This reflex betrays Dasein’s understand-
ing, that which is non-thematically, non-interpretively disclosed to 
Dasein as definite possibilities. Also, recall that “attunement al-
ways has its understanding, even if only by suppressing it. Un-
derstanding is always attuned” (Heidegger 1996, 134[142-43]). 
This means that because angst is a possible attunement in the 
mode of everydayness, every other attunement of everydayness is 
in effect suppressed angst as well. Heidegger believes this to be 
sufficient ground for asserting it as being the case. 
  
The everydayness of this fleeing, however, shows phe-
nomenally that Angst as a fundamental kind of attune-
ment belongs to the essential constitution of Da-sein in 
being-in-the-world which, as an existential one, is never 
objectively present, but is itself always in the mode of fac-
tical Da-sein, that is, in the mode of attunement. Tranquil-
ized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanni-
ness of Da-sein, not the other way around. (Heidegger 
1996, 177[189]) 
 
Think of the actual attunement of angst as a magnification of 
the being of Dasein within which we get to see the moment that 
Dasein turns from itself into the world. We see that the alternative 
to everydayness is something that Dasein wishes to avoid, and 
which can arise at any time. We see that Dasein avoids this by 
fleeing into the world. Also, fleeing into the world is characteristic 
of all of Dasein's inauthentic behavior. Thus, we can conclude that 
any time inauthentic Dasein is not fleeing, Dasein is experiencing 
angst. We can conclude that if Dasein were not involved in the 
world, Dasein would experience itself as uncanny.  
The juxtaposition itself is not enough to justify the privileging 
of uncanniness, yet Heidegger insists that “Not-being-at-home 
must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more pri-
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mordial phenomenon” (Heidegger 1996, 177[189]). This is why 
attunement is such an important method for Heidegger, because 
it can let us draw things that are normally disclosed as merely 
possible in understanding close by circumspection. Therefore, we 
can establish that uncanniness so far from signifying the opposite 
of the “falling” of everyday being-in-the-world, is premised and 
reliant upon the negation of it. We know this because involve-
ment as negated angst is a phenomenon in which uncanniness is 
disclosed. “Da-sein is anxious in the very ground of its be-
ing” (Heidegger 1996, 177[190]). Its typical negation despite its 
fundamentality explains the rarity of real angst.  
Its possibility is most explicitly grasped when we get bored 
or restless due to the threat of losing all interest in anything. All 
of this demonstrates that we flee into the world away from our-
selves, because involvement is fundamentally a reaction to the 
possibility of feeling that we are not quite at home here; that is, 
we struggle to fit in because at our core we do not feel like we fit 
in. 
On the grounds of this analysis, Heidegger defines the being 
of everyday Dasein as Sorge. In German this means “worry,” al-
though it is translated as “care” because it should be taken to 
have a neutral connotation. Heidegger views the play between 
the angst of not being absorbed in the world and the “worry” 





Thus, Heidegger does not declare that angst is latent to posit 
it as a motivational or psychological justification of falling. Al-
though the meaning of falling is fleeing, this simply means that 
phenomenology discloses that when Dasein feels angst, it comes 
face to face with itself and the feeling that it in no way feels at 
home in the world. Insofar as angst is negated by the tranquilli-
zation of turning towards the world, as long as Dasein remains 
absorbed in the world, angst does not threaten it. Dasein must be 
circumspectly leery of the fact that it could face its uncanniness 
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at any given time, although as long as Dasein cares about things 
in the world, the uncanniness subsides because it no longer 
comes before itself as an individual out of place in the world. 
Rather than being a motivational or psychological account, Hei-
degger’s account of angst treats it as something that Dasein 
brings with it to the world. It is inevitable, but since it is dealt 
with most of the time, its status is not thematically clear in Hei-
degger’s work.  
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15. That is, shows the meaning of this falling to be Dasein run-
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